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Abstract: Financial crises are recurring phenomena and studying how economic 
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around the causes and effects of two crises in the period 1985-2013 and their 
separate effects on the economies of Denmark, Sweden and Finland. Moreover, the 
main variable in focus is the exchange rate. Implications of different choices of 
exchange rate regime will be explored in detail. The research combines a theoretical 
study with simple econometrics in order to try to find support for some sort of 
causation or correlation between the choice of exchange rate regime and economic 
growth. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
As financial crises are a recurring phenomenon, studying how the choice of exchange rate 
regime can influence economic behaviour is a field of research deemed to be useful and 
important. Although there has been much research conducted on what role the exchange rate 
plays in monetary policy and its consequences for economic growth and stability, the causal 
link between the factors is hard, even impossible, to prove. This thesis will look into what 
conclusions have been drawn from a variety of literature and research, and relate it to the 
cases of Denmark, Sweden and Finland to see if available data seem to support the findings.  
 
Denmark, Sweden and Finland are geographically close, have shown similar patterns of 
deregulations of financial markets in the 1980s, and they all adopted fixed exchange rates in 
the post-war era. There are important differences as well. For example, the decision to join 
the EC/EU occurred at quite different points in time with Denmark being almost two decades 
ahead of Sweden and Finland. In the late 1980s and early 1990s there were different 
structural policies being implemented, which according to several studies seem to have had 
an effect on the economic development in the 1990s and 2000s. Denmark was experiencing 
high unemployment already in the 1980s and implemented new policies during what has 
become known as the Kartoffelkur, which might explain why the country was able to better 
handle the financial and currency crises spreading out in the Nordic countries in the early 
1990s. Whether this also helped Denmark to sustain a pegged currency has been up for 
debate. This thesis will reflect on the similarities and differences in monetary policy and 
economic development between Denmark, Sweden and Finland, the two latter whom can be 
argued to have conducted and experienced quite similar patterns during the first half of the 
chosen time frame. At least up until Finland decided to join the EMU, another topic that is 
still heavily debated and also to some extent will be discussed in this thesis. 
 
1.2 PURPOSE AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
The purpose is to study the evolution of exchange rate regimes in Denmark, Sweden, and 
Finland and their role in different financial crises during the late 1980s up to the late 2000s, 
as well as what effect the exchange rate has on economic growth and recovery from financial 
crises. The research question can be specified as follows:  
What impact did the choice of exchange rate regime have on economic development and 
	   6	  
crisis recovery in Denmark, Sweden and Finland during the years 1985-2013?  
 
In order to reach a stronger conclusion, a few further sub-questions are stated to assist with 
the research process: 
• Why did Denmark not experience as severe of a crisis as Sweden and Finland in the 
early 1990s?  
• What role did the flexible exchange rate play in Sweden’s recovery from the 2008-2009 
financial crisis, and can the exchange rate be argued to be a reason as to why the 
country handled the crisis better than Finland and Denmark?  
 
1.3 AIM OF THE THESIS 
The aim of this thesis is to shed some light on what implications the choice of exchange rate 
regime had for the use of monetary and fiscal policy in Sweden, Finland and Denmark, and 
whether or not it had any effect on the outcome of economic development and stability in the 
aftermath of the two financial crises. While several studies have been conducted on the way 
Finland and Sweden dealt with the turbulence in the early 1990s up to the recent financial 
crisis, not as many includes Denmark to a great extent, which most likely has to do with the 
fact that Denmark did things differently. This, along with the notion that it is hard to 
econometrically entangle all the possible effects the exchange rate may have on economic 
factors, makes testing for statistical significance among these three countries and their 
choices of exchange rate regime hard. Because of that this thesis will primarily examine what 
empirical evidence has been found so far in the literature, and relate it to the chosen 
framework as well as to descriptive statistics of data available on the development of 
significant economic indicators for Denmark, Sweden and Finland. However, in order to 
support the discussion on what helped Sweden’s recovery from the 2008-2009 a simple 
regression and a VAR analysis will be used to analyse the relationship between the exchange 
rate and economic growth. 
 
1.4 DISPOSITION 
Following the initial chapter stating the research question and presenting the subject and aim 
of the thesis, chapter two introduces the theoretical framework. This includes explanations of 
different exchange rate regimes, basic monetary and fiscal policy, as well as the 
macroeconomic trilemma and the possible connection between capital flows and financial 
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crises. The third chapter will offer an insight into the results drawn by previous studies on the 
role of the exchange rate and effects and causes of the crises in the 1990s and the 2000s. The 
fourth chapter will introduce the methodology of the study conducted in this thesis as well as 
present the data and models. Chapter five deals with an overview of the macroeconomic 
policies, including exchange rate policies, and economic development in Denmark, Sweden 
and Finland from the 1980s up to the early 2010s. Chapter six presents and analyses 
descriptive statistics using calculations and graphs as well as the results from the econometric 
models. The results will also be compared to those of previous studies within the field. The 
seventh chapter is where the discussion and analysis will take part. The discussion is based 
on the sub-questions to the research question presented in this chapter. This means that the 
role of the exchange rate will first be analysed in relation to the crisis of the 1990s, and 
thereafter in the light of the crisis of 2008-2009. The last chapter will offer a summarising 
conclusion. 
 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Chapter two reviews the theoretical framework that later is applied onto the case studies of 
Denmark, Sweden and Finland. 
 
2.1 EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES 
The real exchange rate is a relative price, comparing prices on baskets of goods in different 
countries. It further shows the international competitiveness of a country. In the short term 
there seems to exist a relationship between changes in the nominal exchange rate and changes 
in the real rate, due to the fact that prices are sticky. In the long term, however, the situation 
is not the same. This is because over time prices are able to adapt and adjust to surrounding 
conditions. As a result, countries’ real and nominal rates may show different developments 
over time (Nessén & Degrér, 2003). With a fixed exchange rate the government possesses the 
option of intervening on the money market. For example, if currency appreciation is affecting 
a country’s exports in a negative way, it could be suitable for the central bank to interfere and 
try to stimulate economic behaviour in the right direction. The opposite case, a depreciation 
of the currency, could cause imports to become more expensive. This would put pressure on 
the central bank’s inflation target, also justifying an intervention (Pilbeam, 2013). 
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Exchange rate fluctuations constitute a risk as financial transactions, investments, and so on, 
can be noted in different currencies depending on the residence of the agents involved. 
Adopting a fixed exchange rate limits this form of risk. Another argument for choosing a 
fixed exchange rate is that cooperation and coordination between countries are usually deeper 
than under floating exchange rates, which can be useful when dealing with problems arising 
on an international level (Pilbeam, 2013). 
 
With a floating exchange rate the value of the domestic currency is allowed to fluctuate. 
Changes in the demand and supply of money cause alterations in the currency value. Under 
such a regime the central bank does not interfere by buying or selling domestic currency on 
the foreign exchange market. A floating exchange rate can help to automatically adjust to 
equilibrium between supply and demand, leading to equilibrium in the balance of payments. 
Furthermore, the possibility of independent monetary policy will exist (Pilbeam, 2013). 
Milton Friedman stated in 1953 that it is more suitable to let exchange rates adjust to the 
effects of shocks on their own rather than to use a fixed exchange rate and try to force the 
economic variables to adjust (Pilbeam, 2013). 
 
2.2 MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY 
The monetary policy tools used by the central government have effects on many different 
parts of the economy, and in several different ways. Interest rates, exchange rates and credit 
granting are three examples of common ways in which policies are targeted and carried out. 
Financial conditions and interest rates tend to react relatively quickly to policy rates. Inflation 
as well as the demand and production sides of the economy take a bit longer to adapt to new 
conditions (Elmér et al., 2012). 
 
The balance of payments consists of the current account, the capital and financial account, 
and the official settlements balance. These accounts can be good indicators for policy-makers 
in open economies and the size and sign (positive or negative) of the figures can affect 
decisions on economic policies such as the exchange rate regime. For example, if the 
government wants to pursue an expansionary monetary policy, it would buy bonds from the 
public. This would result in a price increase of bonds as well as an expansion of the monetary 
supply, which cause domestic interest rates to drop. In turn, the drop will fuel new 
investments, which means an increased production and hence higher output. The whole 
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procedure has a negative effect on the current account, at the same time as the lower interest 
rates cause higher capital outflows, which will lead to a deficit in the balance of payments. 
With fiscal policy, on the other hand, the money from selling bonds is used to fund enlarged 
government spending. This means that the size of the money supply is not altered (Pilbeam, 
2013). Fiscal policy includes actions connected to tax regulation. For example, a tax 
reduction would lead to an increase of disposable income, thus expanding private 
consumption. Tax increases, on the other hand, would have the opposite effect (Johansen & 
Trier, 2014). Fiscal policy further contains what is referred to as automatic stabilizers. These 
are counter-cyclical adjustment mechanisms of expenditures and public revenues present in 
the swings of the business cycle (Flam et al., 2009). 
 
2.3 THE MACROECONOMIC POLICY TRILEMMA 
Robert Mundell, the 1999 Nobel Prize winner and ‘father of the Euro’, is a big name in the 
debate of exchange rate regimes. He is a big promoter of currency unions and is also well 
known for his part in the theory of the macroeconomic trilemma (Suherland et al., 2012). The 
Mundell-Fleming trilemma or open economy trilemma describes a relationship between free 
capital flows, independent monetary policy, and fixed exchange rates by saying that all three 
are not possible to conduct simultaneously (Findlay & O’Rourke, 2007). This framework 
implies that opening up markets to international financial flows to some extent demands a 
certain set of policy choices from the country. 
 
Giving up the possibility to conduct independent monetary policy and the automatic 
stabilisation of the value of the exchange rate might be argued to halt the recovery process 
after economic crises. If this is true, it seems like a flexible exchange rate would be the 
optimal choice, at least for small, open economies such as the ones that are studied here. 
Whether this can really be the case is a problem dealt with later on in the thesis.  
 
2.4 CAPITAL FLOWS AND FINANCIAL CRISES 
Barry Eichengreen argues for the existence of a connection between capital flows and crises. 
According to his research there has been an increase in the frequency of crises lately. This 
especially refers to currency crises. The increase in the number of crises has in turn promoted 
the frequency of twin crises. A twin crisis refers to a phenomenon where a currency crisis and 
a banking/financial crisis occur simultaneously. The increase of twin crises has had 
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devastating effects on the output of many economies. Unfortunately, cross-country studies 
have not been able to produce much evidence for the nature of the connection between capital 
flows and crises, which partly has to do with the difficulty to measure a country’s openness to 
capital flows (Eichengreen, 2003). 
 
There are different arguments for what effects capital flows have. Firstly, it has been 
suggested that free flows reduce restrictions on resource mobilisation, enhance institutional 
change and transmit technological and organisational knowledge. Consequently, this view 
supports the theory that capital flows promote economic growth. Policies that urge capital to 
be transmitted from rich countries to those where capital is scarce would thus be the most 
justifiable policies. Secondly, some argue that the flow of capital is a source of instability due 
to that information asymmetries between international agents tend to be larger than within a 
society. Generally, it seems to exist a negative relationship between income per capita and 
the existence of capital controls, and a much-believed consequence is that as capital mobility 
expands, it becomes more problematic to effectively manage a currency peg (Eichengreen, 
2003). 
 
Lending booms, which seem to be a common phenomenon initiating banking crises, tend to 
be more likely to occur in certain environments. According to Eichengreen (2003), lending 
booms usually appear during the upswing of the global business cycle and in periods of 
expanding world trade. As will be evident later on, this seems to be true for the crises 
spreading out in the Nordic countries during the early 1990s. 
 
  
3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Studies on the exchange rate and crisis recovery, both generally as well as on the Nordic 
countries, is presented and reviewed in this chapter. 
 
3.1 FINANCIAL CRISES IN THE NORDICS 
In a study conducted by Lars Jonung in 2010 on the Nordic financial crisis in the early 1990s, 
one main point made was that the reasons behind the escalation of the financial crisis (or twin 
crisis) in the early 1990s can be seen as a result of liberalizing financial markets in an 
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environment where a pegged but adjustable currency was at the centre of the monetary 
system. The liberalisation led to a long and excessive lending boom, rising asset prices, 
followed by an increase in investment and consumption behaviour. After the turn sometime 
around 1990, varying a bit among the countries, employment fell, GDP growth turned 
negative, and unemployment rose drastically. Sweden and Finland had no choice but to 
abandon their pegged currencies in order to avert the depression that was spreading. Jonung 
finds that the reason for the governments not being able to soften the boom was largely due to 
the pegged exchange rates that made it impossible for the countries’ to conduct completely 
independent monetary policies. Interest rate increases could not be used to affect 
consumption behaviour to the extent that was necessary, even though the rise in the real rate 
had some effects on asset prices in the form of asset price deflation. The records seem to 
show that even though the national budgets showed large surpluses from increasing taxes as a 
result of larger consumption, higher wages and similar developments, the fiscal policies still 
were not tight enough to dampen the accelerating boom. Furthermore, Jonung finds that 
speculative attacks hit both the Swedish krona and the Finnish mark, following hand in hand 
with the European currency crisis breaking out in 1992, the same month as the Finnish 
currency started floating. The Swedish one went the same direction two months later 
(Jonung, 2010). 
 
According to Jonung (2010) the number one reason leading to the Nordic countries’ recovery 
from the crisis environment of the early 1990s was an accelerating growth in exports. The 
policies adopted after the 1990s crisis in Finland and Sweden were initially designed to 
reduce budget deficits. Later, the focus was changed and the target became to lower the 
public debt. These fiscal policies showed to be effective. In the following five years Finland 
and Sweden managed to turn their budget deficit into surpluses (Jonung, 2010). 
 
One of the conclusions Jonung draws from the financial crisis of the early 1990s is that 
official forecasts at the time were not able to correctly predict and identify the boom-bust 
cycle. Economists generally were in favour of free capital flows but did not fully understand 
what imbalances and other effects that could follow, as well as what measures needed to be in 
place to handle these. Jonung suggests that when initiating a move towards liberalized capital 
markets, the real interest rate should be somewhat close to the international equilibrium level. 
A cautious approach might result in a smoother transition (Jonung, 2010). But whether this 
would be possible in practise is questionable. Most likely the policy makers did what they 
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deemed to be the most suitable approach from the information available. It is always easier to 
find the ‘correct’ solution to problems in hindsight than it is at the time of its appearance. 
 
Although Jonung’s research from 2010 is mostly targeted towards Sweden, Finland and 
Norway who all showed a somewhat similar pattern in the wake and recovery of the financial 
crisis – even though Norway due to its heavy reliance on natural resources is deemed to be a 
special case – he does assign a few sentences to Denmark. He discusses why this country 
managed to take advantage of the positive effects of liberalisation without ending up deep 
into the crisis and having to abandon its pegged currency. A well-capitalised banking system 
along with monetary and financial policies targeted towards macroeconomic and financial 
stability are the key components, even though Jonung in this study does not further elaborate 
on what exact policies made Denmark successful and whether or not these policies would 
have been applicable in the cases of Sweden, Finland and Norway. 
 
Jaakko Kiander and Pentti Vartia conducted a study exploring the similar developments in 
Sweden and Finland during the 1990s. They much like Jonung conclude that the reason 
behind the crisis and recession of the early 1990s was largely the result of deregulations of 
financial markets (Kiander & Vartia, 2011). The liberalisation of markets started earlier in 
Denmark, and this head start could be an explanation as of why Denmark managed the 
transition without ending up in a large financial crisis. Consumption and investments were 
further brought down by solvency problems. This caused output and employment to fall both 
in Finland and Sweden between 1991 and 1993. The focus on exchange rate targeting 
removed depreciation alternatives that could have been helpful in these times, and led to 
central banks having to maintain high interest rates (Kiander & Vartia, 2011). 
 
According to Kiander and Vartia, the biggest contribution to the recovery from the crisis in 
the early 1990s was the relaxation of monetary policy along with currency depreciation 
following the EMS crisis of 1992. The adopted lower interest rates stimulated an 
environment with more stable asset prices, putting an end to deflationary pressures. In 1994 
private consumption and investment were once more showing positive growth patterns. 
Kiander and Vartia agree with Jonung that forecast errors of the crisis were big, actually 
bigger than what the average forecast errors had been in the post-war period for these 
countries. They conclude that it is difficult to open up markets to free financial flows when 
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conducting a fixed exchange rate (Kiander & Vartia, 2011). However, Denmark is one of the 
countries that did manage this transition without having to change the exchange rate regime. 
Unfortunately, Denmark is not part of Kiander and Vartia’s analysis, so this thesis will have 
to pick up where they left off in order to compare Sweden and Finland with the case of 
Denmark, and see whether or not a flexible exchange rate seems to be better for dealing with 
the negative effects of financial crises. 
 
3.2 THE ROLE OF THE EXCHANGE RATE 
Suni and Vihriälä (ETLA Report from 2013) explores what would have happened if Sweden 
had joined the EMU at its beginning in 1999. This is done through a counterfactual analysis. 
They find inflationary performance to be quite similar between Finland and Sweden, even 
though these countries have pursued different choices of exchange rate regimes. Furthermore, 
they find that since the start of the recent global crisis Sweden has fared better than Finland 
and its GDP growth has been higher. In their simulation of the outcome of a Swedish EMU 
membership in the counterfactual analysis, Suni and Vihriälä set the Swedish central bank 
rate equal to the level of the ECB steering rate. The exchange rate of 1999 was used to fix the 
euro exchange rate. Their results suggest that the rate of inflation would have been almost the 
same if Sweden had been part of the monetary union as it was with independent monetary 
policy. Their analysis on GDP data for Sweden and Finland suggests that the choice of 
monetary regime of these two countries have not affected economic growth to any large 
extent. The growth rates up until 2009 are very similar (Suni & Vihriälä, 2013). However, 
considering that these findings are based on only a decade of data, it is hard to draw any 
major conclusions. If Finland and Sweden were to experience another crisis in the future and 
they both stay with their separate exchange rate regimes, we cannot be sure results would 
have beeen the same. It can be assumed, though, that the longer time period the two countries 
stay with their chosen exchange rates, the more data can be collected and, hopefully, more 
accurate and trustworthy conclusions can be drawn.  
 
In a report published by GnS economics in 2012, the role of the exchange rate and the EMU 
membership of Finland were analysed. By conducting an analysis where the data of a 
different reality where Finland had not decided to join the EMU in 1999 is simulated, the 
costs and benefits of Finland’s membership in the monetary union are estimated and 
discussed. The timeframe used ranges from 1999 to 2011. The drawbacks of this type of 
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counterfactual analyses, similar to the one conducted by Suni and Vihriälä, is that it relies on 
many assumptions. One of these assumptions is that it assumes that everything in the world 
economy would happen in the same way in the imaginary scenario as it did in reality. 
Furthermore, in the GnS economics study it is assumed that even if Finland would not have 
joined the EMU the country would still make all the structural arrangements necessary for 
fulfilling the criteria for an EMU membership. This assumption can be questioned. If Finland 
had not wanted to join the monetary union, then why would it use resources to adapt to the 
union’s regulatory framework and convergence criteria? 
 
The simulation in the study is based on the exchange rate between the Swedish krona and the 
Finnish mark. Both the interest rate differential (based on ten-year government bonds) and 
the partially simulated history of the exchange rate are used to simulate the exchange rate 
between the mark and the krona. Furthermore, the exports of Finland in the imaginary 
scenario where Finland is not part of the EMU are simulated. The model is created with a 
dependence mainly on GDP growth rates of the euro zone and the United States. According 
to the simulations and statistical estimation results a depreciation of the exchange rate 
between the mark/euro rate and rising economic activity on the world markets lead to 
increases in the Finnish exports. Appreciation and decreasing economic activity naturally 
would have the opposite effect (GnS economics, 2012).  
  
The results from this study suggest that if Finland had remained outside the euro zone, the 
export during the IT bubble would have been about six per cent less. However, its exports 
would have shown a more stable development in the early 2000s as well as during the 2008-
2009 financial crisis. In other words, the recovery from the financial crisis would likely have 
been smoother if Finland had not been an EMU member. This is partly due to the fact that in 
that scenario Finland could have used its independent monetary policy to cause the currency 
to depreciate, leading to an increase in exports. The study further finds that production over 
time has decreased in Finland. At the time of the study, it was found that production costs in 
Finland were about twenty per cent higher than in Sweden. The results from the simulation 
model indicate that sticking to the Mark would not have completely prevented the export and 
productivity decrease. In conclusion, the study finds both pros and cons with the euro 
membership. It helped Finland gain more benefits during the IT boom 2000-2001, but had 
negative effects on the outcome of the Finnish economy in the 2008-2009 financial crisis 
(GnS economics, 2012). 
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Ghosh et al. (1996) find a strong link between the choice of exchange rate regime and 
economic growth. Their research is conducted from an overall perspective and not limited to 
a certain few countries or targeted specifically towards the Scandinavian region. Their results 
suggest that a pegged exchange rate might lead to a lower rate of inflation, and a flexible 
exchange rate may allow for faster growth and development. Furthermore, they find that 
higher shares of investment seem to be present under pegged exchange rates, while faster 
productivity growth tends to occur under flexible rates. In their sample, the net per capita 
GDP growth showed to be somewhat higher under a floating exchange rate regime. While it 
is hard to entangle the effects of the exchange rate on variables such as growth and inflation, 
since the exchange rate has several both direct and indirect effects, Ghosh et al. do try to 
make their study quite comprehensive. They use data for all IMF countries from 1960 to 
1990, and differ from earlier studies by including different levels of pegged and flexible 
exchange rates as well as the difference between the exchange rate declared by the central 
government and the one actually shown in practice. The link between fixed exchange rates 
and low inflation comes from both a discipline effect and a confidence effect. The first one 
refers to the political costs associated with leaving a pegged currency, and the latter to the 
amount of trust in the government. The study supports evidence in both directions of the 
causality of this link. 
 
The research of Ghosh et al. (1996) concludes that the exchange rate does matter, and that the 
strongest connection can be found between the exchange rate and inflation. The test results 
showed lower inflation and smaller variance for fixed exchange rate regimes compared to 
floating rates. It cannot be fully proved that the one thing affect the other, but Ghosh et al. 
argue that there seems to be evidence supporting at least some form of causal effect (Ghosh 
et al., 1996). This study was chosen because it is considered to be a large study that 
incorporates several countries and hence could be a good compliment to the previous four 
which focused exclusively on a few Nordic countries. However, since this research was 
carried out before the recent global crisis it can be assumed that some of the results might not 
be the same if the study were to be repeated with more recent time series data gathered from 
the 2000s. 
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Lastly, in 2011 Horst Feldman published a paper exploring the effects of exchange rate 
volatility on unemployment. It is based on annual data on 17 countries from 1982 to 2003, 
including Sweden, Finland and Denmark. His results suggest that higher volatility in the real 
effective exchange rate leads to higher unemployment rate. In the model it has been 
controlled for other variables that affect unemployment, including labour market institutions, 
business cycle fluctuations, product market regulations, and share of trade in GDP. The 
results show support for an argument that exchange rate volatility in a certain year has an 
effect on unemployment in the coming year (Feldman, 2011). 
 
 
4. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
Chapter four introduces and justifies the methodology used in the research conducted for this 
thesis as well as present the data and econometric models. 
 
4.1 METHODOLOGY 
The main approach of this thesis is literature-based and descriptive, with research on what 
policies were implemented and what differences and similarities can be seen between 
countries, as well as whether or not the choice of exchange rate regime can be a possible 
explanation of what has been observed. This will be done by analysing data on GDP, 
investments, inflation, unemployment, exports, and current account balances. Furthermore, 
there will be a minor econometric part in order to research if there seems to be reason to 
believe that there is any relation between the exchange rate and some macroeconomic 
indicators for economic growth.  
 
4.1.1 LIMITATIONS 
In order to get a good understanding of each and every country’s economic development and 
policy decisions, the study has been limited to involve only three countries. These are 
Denmark, Sweden and Finland. While it would have been interesting to search for heavy 
support for a correlation between exchange rates and economic development, the extent of 
such a model lies beyond the scope of this research. This is due to the fact that it is too hard 
to disentangle the specific effects of the exchange rate, since the state of an economy is 
affected also by many other factors. There will, however, be a simple regression model as 
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well as a VAR analysis based on data for Sweden 1995-2010 in order to see if there seems to 
be any support for a correlation in the given data. This is though mostly used as a supplement 
to the major literature and descriptive-based analysis to determine whether or not the 
conclusions drawn from this analysis possibly could be thought to have any statistical 
significance. Furthermore, on some of the descriptive statistics the graphs do not show the 
entire period of 1985-2013 due to limitations in data availability. 
 
4.1.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
To support and further evaluate on and discuss the information gathered from different 
literature, secondary data has been gathered from existing databases and used for comparative 
and descriptive analysis. Data has been plotted in graphs in order for it to be compared both 
between countries and over time. Furthermore, the standard deviations and correlation 
coefficients for some data series have been calculated.  
 𝜎 = 𝐸[(𝑋 − 𝐸(𝑋))!]          (1) 
Source: Westerlund, 2005 
Equation 1 depicts the general formula for the standard deviation. 𝜎 is the sign for the 
standard deviation, 𝐸[(𝑋 − 𝐸(𝑋))!] represents the mean squared value of the observed value 
of each observation minus the calculated mean value of the observations. 
 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟 𝑋,𝑌 = !"#(!,!)!!!! = ![(!!! ! ) !!!(!) ]!!!!          (2) 
Source: Westerlund, 2005 
The correlation coefficient describes the relationship between two variables, X and Y, in a 
closed interval. A perfect negative correlation would have a coefficient of -1, and (+)1 would 
represent a perfect positive correlation. 0 would mean no correlation at all. The correlation 
could further be expressed as the covariance between X and Y divided by the standard 
deviation of X multiplied by the standard deviation of Y (Westerlund, 2005). 
 
4.1.3 ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION 
As a complement to the discussion based on descriptive statistics and available literature, an 
econometric model will be estimated to shed some light on whether the causal effect of 
changes in the exchange rate seems to be visible in the data, and whether or not the topic of 
this thesis seems to be backed by some statistical significance. Low unemployment is a sign 
of economic wellbeing, and reducing unemployment after a crisis is often a much desired 
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step in the recovery process. In order to see if the exchange rate possibly can be used to affect 
the unemployment rate a regression with unemployment as the dependant variable will be 
run. The regression was inspired by some previous studies conducted on exchange rates 
(Feldman, 2011; Edlund & Karlsson, 1993) and can be specified as follows: 
 𝑈𝑁! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐸𝑅!!! + 𝛽!𝐺𝐷𝑃!!! + 𝛽!𝐶𝑃𝐼!!! + 𝑒!           (3) 
 UN! is the logged first difference of unemployment at time t, β! is the intercept, β!!! are 
coefficients, ER is the logged first difference in the SEK/USD exchange rate, and CPI is the 
logged first difference in the consumer price index used as a proxy for inflationary 
development. 𝑒! is the error term at time t. t-4 represent time t minus four quarters, i.e. one 
year prior to t.  
 
4.1.4 VECTOR AUTOREGRESSIVE MODEL (VAR) 
In order to further elaborate on what the data set says about the different variables a vector 
autoregressive model will be constructed based on the same variables as the OLS regression. 
In an article by Edlund and Karlsson (1993) a VAR model was used to forecast and analyse 
different variables’ effect on the Swedish unemployment rate. This article inspired the choice 
of model used in this thesis. The VAR model describes the development of selected variables 
over the sample period (1995-2010) as linear functions of historical values. Every variable 
has its own equation that depicts a linear relationship between the dependent variable and its 
own lagged values as well as lagged values of the explanatory variables. It treats all variables 
symmetrically and as endogenous, hence not making any assumptions regarding an 
exogenous nature of the explanatory variables (Enders, 2010). In the process of estimating 
the VAR model results that will be presented later on, STATA was ordered to choose the 
most appropriate number of lags. The maximum number of lags was set to eight, and the 
result became a model with equations using four lags for each variable. This is consistent 
with the number of lags used for the OLS regression as well as with what Feldman (2011) 
used in his. The choice of incorporating lags into the equations lies upon assumptions that the 
unemployment ratio is not immediately affected by changes in the explanatory variables. 
Using a lag of one year allows the model to detect connections in changes up to a year prior 
to time t. Furthermore, Feldman (2011) motivates his choice of a one-year lag with the 
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argument that it removes some of the concerns regarding a possible simultaneity bias as well 
as accepts the possibility of sluggish adjustment.  
 
The equations of the VAR model developed for this paper are specified in Appendix 1. Just 
like in the OLS regression the variables are unemployment, exchange rate, GDP and CPI. In 
the VAR analysis, however, four different regressions are fitted into the model. One with 
unemployment as the dependant variable, one with exchange rate as the dependant variable, 
one with the exchange rate, and one with CPI. Also, not only the values at t-4 (one year prior 
to the point in time denoted t), but t-1, t-2, t-3, and t-4 are all included for every variable in 
each equation, making the VAR model more comprehensive than the OLS regression.  
 
As briefly mentioned, the VAR model does not demand variables to be exogenous. Since the 
model used in this paper only incorporates four variables assuming that each of them is 
completely endogenous to the model and only affected by one another is not realistic. Neither 
is an assumption of all variables being exogenous. Several other forces outside of this model 
most likely also affect the unemployment ratio, both externally and internally. In the 
economic sciences models where the explanatory variables to some extent are also affected 
by dependent variable(s) are common and a way to deal with this issue without making 
unrealistic assumptions about the exogenous or endogenous nature of variables is to use an 
autoregressive model such as VAR (Asteriou & Hall, 2011). The assumed simultaneity 
among variables supports an approach where all variables are to be treated equally, as 
endogenous, independent of whether they are actually endogenous or exogenous (Enders, 
2010). The VAR model can give an idea of in which way there could be a possible causality 
or, more correctly, Granger causality. 
 
4.2 DATA 
 
4.2.1 DATA FOR DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The data on exchange rates comes from the World Bank. This data is yearly averages, and is 
shown as the number of local currency units per US dollar. It comprises data from 1985 to 
2013 for the Swedish (SEK), Danish (DKK) and Finnish (FIN, EUR) currencies. Data on 
exports have also been gathered from the World Bank statistical database, and shows exports 
as a percentage of total GDP from 1985 to 2013. The data on public debt as a percentage of 
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GDP comes from the same database, and is available from 1995 to 2012 on a yearly basis. 
Data on gross national savings (with 2013 as the base year), inflation, unemployment and the 
current account balances 1985-2013 come from the IMF economic outlook database. They 
are all yearly data. GDP per capita data come from the World Bank, PPP adjusted and with 
2011 as the base year. Constant prices denoted in international dollars are used. The reason 
for several different databases being used is due to the limitations of data available for the 
chosen time period in the individual databases. 
 
4.2.2 DATA FOR REGRESSION AND VAR ANALYSIS 
For the econometric models data on unemployment, the SEK/USD exchange rate, GDP, and 
CPI from 1995 to 2010 are used. The time frame is both due to limitations of available data 
as well as the fact that it was of interest to only use data of a period when the exchange rate 
was allowed to float (another possibility could have been to include a dummy variable taking 
on a different value for fixed and flexible rate) as well as to include the turbulent years of the 
recent financial crisis. The seasonally adjusted quarterly unemployment data was collected 
from the Eurostat database, the quarterly data on the SEK/USD exchange rate from the 
Swedish central bank (Riksbanken), and the seasonally adjusted quarterly data on GDP from 
Statistics Sweden. The GDP data is in constant prices, with 2013 as the reference year. The 
data on consumer price index, CPI, was also collected from Statistics Sweden. The data was 
available on a monthly basis but recalculated to a quarterly average. 
 
 
5. COUNTRY-SPECIFIC OVERVIEWS 
Chapter five goes through the economic characteristics of the three Nordic countries in 
focus, especially concerning what policies, market liberalizations and structural changes that 
were implemented in the 1980s and first half of the 1990s. 
 
5.1 DENMARK 
Sources: Ingebritsen, 1988; Møller Christensen & Topp, 1997; Johansen & Trier, 2014. 
* 1973: joined EC 
* 1982: monetary policy with exchange rate stability as the main goal 
* 1987: Danish currency pegged to the D-Mark 
* 1986: policies and structural change was implemented in what has been known as the kartoffelkur 
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Similar to several other countries, export of raw materials was the number one sector 
contributing to production, output and development in Denmark (Ingebritsen, 1998). But 
after joining the EC as the first Nordic country in 1973, transformation could be seen in the 
Danish economy. Structural changes were made in 1982, involving the commitment to keep a 
fixed exchange rate along with tightening of fiscal policy and a law against wage indexation. 
Even though there was instability in the Danish economy, the government decided to stick 
with the exchange rate goals and did not follow Sweden’s path towards large devaluations 
(Møller Christensen & Topp, 1997). 
 
In the early 1990s, there was a move from agriculture to manufactured goods as the most 
crucial contributor to national income (Ingebritsen, 1998). The average increase in consumer 
prices was about 6.9 per cent in 1980-1989. This number fell to below three per cent in the 
1990s. This, as well as the decline in growth rate of wages can be explained by Denmark’s 
political shift, deciding to focus on maintaining a stable currency rate over the other EU 
countries. Along with this, the government resigned from using repeated devaluations to deal 
with economic problems (Johansen & Trier, 2014). Furthermore, the increase in prices of oil 
and raw materials in 2008 resulted in rising consumer prices. This trend was reversed during 
the crisis (Johansen & Trier, 2014).  
 
Consumption increased at an impressive rate in the second half of the 1980s, and in 1986 it 
reached past seven per cent. Hand in hand with this, the balance of payments was showing a 
large and increasing deficit. The government acted by enforcing what has been known as the 
Kartoffelkur in October 1986 as an attempt to curve the consumption bubble. One important 
part of this policy was the adoption of mixed loans that put tighter regulations on the real 
estate market. This, along with tax reforms limiting the interest deduction, contributed to both 
a fall in house prices as a result of less demand as well as a decrease in the overall 
consumption. It was not until 1990 that a positive trend could once more be seen in the 
consumption patterns. In 1993, mixed loans that had been introduced during the Kartoffelkur 
was once again removed and annuity loans reintroduced. At the same time as the credit rules 
came into action there was a large reduction in the interest rate, which eventually led to rising 
real estate prices and increased private consumption. In the recession connected to the 2008 
crisis private consumption fell (Johansen & Trier, 2014).  
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Between 1985 and 1994, 47 out of a total of somewhere around 225 banks and savings banks 
were forced to close in Denmark. This was more than the combined number in the preceding 
forty years. However, it did not impact the Danish economy as badly as one might think. The 
assets of the worst-off banks constituted a mere two per cent of the combined assets of all 
Danish banks and savings banks. This can be compared to the banking crisis in the late 
2000s, when more than half of the Danish banks were forced to make reconstructions and 
recapitalisations and several went bankrupt. In the 2007-2009 banking crisis in Denmark, the 
negative effects were larger compared to the crisis in the 1990s, and many needed to be 
bailed out by the government. This is much connected to the fact that by now the inter-bank 
lending with foreign banks had increased significantly, meaning that the Danish economy 
became more vulnerable to events happening on the global markets (Anderson, 2011). 
 
Denmark adopted a monetary policy with exchange rate stability as a key aspect in 1982, and 
in 1987 the Danish currency was pegged to the D-mark (Johansen & Trier, 2014). Denmark 
experienced a long period of recession from 1987 to 1993, something that was not present in 
the neighbouring countries (Johansen & Trier, 2014). In 1993, the band of the ERM was 
widened to plus/minus 15 per cent, allowing for more fluctuations of the pegged exchange 
rates. However, the breakdown of the old ERM system did not affect Denmark as severe as it 
did many other EU countries (Møller Christensen & Topp, 1997).  
 
The Danish currency depreciated in the latter half of 2008 in relation to the outbreak of the 
crisis, also following a period where the difference between the Danish central bank’s 
lending rate and the one of the ECB had been negative. In order to stabilise the currency, 
Denmark’s central bank chose to intervene on the foreign exchange market. However, this 
action was not enough and the central bank had to raise its monetary policy interest rates. The 
currency crisis along with the financial crisis made this a twin crisis. Repeated interventions 
were needed (Padkjær Abildgren, 2011). Denmark did not manage to escape the 2008 crisis 
as smoothly as it did the one in the 1990s. 
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5.2 SWEDEN 
Sources: Nohagen, 2009; Andersen, 2011; Ingebritsen, 1998. 
 
Devaluations characterized much of the beginning of the eighties in Sweden. In 1982 the 
krona was devalued by 16 per cent. Devaluations along with influences from an economic 
upturn in the international business cycle made the Swedish export sector bloom and the 
economy did well during the majority of the 1980s. However, considering the high inflation 
level of the early 1980s (over 10 per cent), the government promised not to use devaluations 
to escape economic crises to the same extent in the future. Sweden was trying to establish a 
stable fixed exchange rate along with a moderate inflation. In the mid-1980s, the benefits 
from the devaluations had been exhausted, and a shortage of labour was becoming evident, 
resulting in an accelerating increase in wages. At about the same time, deregulations of 
financial markets around the world was in motion, integrating the financial markets to a 
greater extent than ever before (Nohagen, 2009). By 1985 interest rate controls were fully 
removed in Sweden. At this point in time lending ceilings on banks and financial institutions 
were also removed. More and more foreign exchange market regulations were further 
abolished from 1985 to 1990 (Andersen, 2011). In 1990 The Swedish Company Law 
Committee was established to change the Swedish Companies Act to follow the EC 
regulations (Ingebritsen, 1998). Events on the world market, such as the reunification of 
Germany (more loans necessary), caused increases in interest rates. Due to the link between 
Nordic currencies and the German mark through currency pegs, interest rates in these 
countries were also affected. Many countries fell into deep recessions. Real estate prices fell 
in Sweden, and a rising budget deficit led to the public (central government) debt becoming 
greater and greater. In the spring of 1990, the government started with restrictive stabilisation 
policies. But it was too late to stop a crisis. The crisis spread from the real estate market to 
the financial market and banking sector (Nohagen, 2009). The high inflation of ten per cent in 
1990 fell to a mere two per cent in 1992. After alowing the exchange rate to float, the 
effective exchange rate dropped by approximately ten per cent (Berg & Gröttheim, 1997).  
* 1985-1990: interest controls and foreign exchange market regulations were removed 
* 1990: The Swedish Company Law Committee was established  to change the Swedish Companies Act to 
follow the EC regulations 
* 1990 (spring): restrictive stabilization policies 
* 1992: floating exchange rate 
* 1995: monetary policy with price stability (2 % inflation) as main goal + EU membership 
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There was also a currency crisis spreading out over Europe, largely affecting Sweden and 
making the existing financial crisis turn into a twin crisis. The Swedish currency was 
overvalued, and the central bank tried to defend the fixed exchange rate by increasing the 
interest rate and using the currency reserve to buy SEK. On the 16 Semptember 1992, the 
steering interest rate was first increased to 75 per cent. When it was clear this increase was 
not helping, the central bank further raised the interest rate to 500 per cent later the same day. 
The economy still demanded the government to keep using its currency reserves. When these 
eventually ran out, Sweden was forced to abandon the fixed exchange rate. This happened on 
the 19 November 1992. Starting from 1993, price stability became the main goal. And in 
1995 the inflation target of two per cent was set. Policies targeted towards keeping the 
inflation low caused a rise in unemployment, which reached 16 % in the mid-1990s. In 1995 
Sweden joined the European Union (Nohagen, 2009). 
 
The Swedish monetary policy framework consists mainly of four parts, an inflation target; 
the inflation forecast by the Swedish central bank; the repo rate, borrowing and lending rates; 
and the portfolio of domestic securities and foreign reserves used to intervene on the money 
market. In February 1995 the central bank for the first time used a repo rate that was allowed 
to vary. This resulted in reactions on the markets which led to higher volatility due to the 
uncertainty of the central bank’s intensions. Hence, the repo rate is now set by the central 
bank itself and no longer allowed to vary (Berg & Gröttheim, 1997). Berg and Gröttheim 
(1997) further summarises the monetary policy aims in the first half of the 1990s as follows. 
November 1992 to summer of 1994  was characterised by an export-led recovery along with 
easing of monetary policy. From August 1995 to December 1995 tighter monetary policy and 
increased capacity utilisation were central cornerstones. 
 
Policy measures used by the Swedish central bank during the recent financial crisis includs 
repo rate cuts and loans offered to Swedish banks not only in SEK but also in US dollars. The 
reason for the latter action was to improve the liquidity of the banks in the Swedish financial 
system.   
 
 
 
	   25	  
5.3 FINLAND 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Andersen, 2011; Ingebritsen, 1998; Rudebeck & Henriksson, n.d.; Lennartsdotter, 2003. 
 
Deregulations were going on all over Europe and Finland was no exception. Together with 
Sweden, Finland was the country worst hit by the banking crisis in the early 1990s. 
Compared to the other Nordic countries, Finland was affected more by the collapses of the 
Russian and Ukrainian economies. In the eighties about twenty per cent of Finland’s exports 
went to Ukraine and Russia, which can be compared with the early 1990s when the 
corresponding percentage was close to zero (Andersen, 2011). After the announced decision 
by the Swedish government to join the EC, Finnish authorities and business sector became 
further concerned of what impact this would have on the business sectors, since the Finish 
industry now relied heavily on the Swedish one. Finland followed Sweden, and in 1995 both 
countries joined the EU (Ingebritsen, 1998). 
 
Just like Sweden, Finland had problems with high inflation that made the country loose its 
competitiveness and further leading to exports declining. Economic growth stagnated in 
1990, and in 1991 the Finnish economy was beginning to shrink (Kiander & Vartia, 2011). 
The unemployment rate increased fivefold between 1990 and 1993. During the same period 
the ratio of public debt to GDP became four times as large and asset prices had fallen by fifty 
per cent (Pikkarainen et al., 1997). In September 1992 Finland was forced to leave its peg for 
a floating exchange rate, and in 1993 they started with inflation targeting, showing a much 
similar time frame to Sweden (Rudebeck & Henriksson, n.d.). The floating exchange rate led 
to the Finnish currency immediately depreciating by 30 per cent. Letting go of the fixed 
exchange rate also made it possible for the central bank to cut the short-term interest rates by 
ten percentage points within a few months (Klander & Vartia, 2011). In 1994 consumption 
and investment started growing again. In 1996 the similarities between Sweden and Finland 
took a different turn as Finland decided to join ERM and, eventually, the EMU (Rudebeck & 
* 1991: collapse of the Soviet Union affecting the Finnish economy 
* 1992: floating exchange rate 
* 1993: the central bank started with inflation targeting (2 %) 
* 1995: Finland joined the EU 
* 1996: joined ERM 
* 1999: joined EMU and adopted the euro 
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Henriksson, n.d.). Finland joined the ERM on 15 October 1996, and was qualified for the 
EMU at its introduction in January 1999 (Lennartsdotter, 2003). The Finnish budget showed 
signs of improving and went from a deficit of three per cent in 1996 to a surplus of one per 
cent in 1998. The inflation fell as well following the upswing in the Finnish business cycle 
(Rudebeck & Henriksson, n.d.). The increased growth of exports starting in 1993 appears to 
have helped the Finnish economy out of the recession (Pikkarainen et al., 1997).  
 
Just like in neighbouring countries, the Finnish banks were heavily indebted with loans they 
struggled to repay. Most of them were secured with collateral that after the housing bubble 
were worth only a fraction of their initial values. These patterns are much similar to what 
happened in many countries in the late 2000s. Finland, however, seems to have drawn lessons 
from its crisis in the nineties, and did not fall as deeply into a trap in the recent crisis as many 
other countries did (Andersen, 2011). In the early 1990s the economic policy was focused on 
reducing external debts and strengthening the balance sheets of Finnish companies. When the 
current account went from a deficit to a surplus in 1994, the new goals became to increase 
efficiency on the labour market, inflation targeting, and cut central government expenditures. 
In 1993 Finland announced an inflation target of two per cent that would be valid starting 
from 1995 (Pikkarainen et al., 1997). 
 
The main goal of the monetary policy of the euro system is price stability, which hence 
currently also is the focus of the Finnish economy (Suomen pankki, n.d.). Since 1999 Finland 
has a joint steering rate with the ECB (Rudebeck & Henriksson, n.d.). Finland’s changeover 
to the ERM went smoothly as the country’s monetary policy showed to be well adapted to the 
ERM conditions. The key rate was close to the German one, and inflation grew according to 
the target, showing that Finland managed to recover from the crisis that had extreme negative 
effects on the economy earlier in the same decade (Lennartsdotter, 2003). 
 
5.4 THE EMU 
As the topic for this thesis circulates around exchange rate regimes, the EMU as a monetary 
union represents a very fixed exchange rate and cannot be excluded from the analysis. An 
important consequence of entering a monetary union is the integration of financial markets 
among member countries. Flam et al. (2009) find support for this phenomenon in the euro 
area. Furthermore, they find positive effects on trade as a result of the elimination of nominal 
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exchange rates due to the common currency. Before a country can join the EMU there are 
criteria that need to be fulfilled. These criteria mainly relates to inflation, long-term interest 
rates, public finances, and the exchange rate. For example, the budget deficit of the country in 
question must not exceed three per cent of GDP, and the public sector’s gross debt is not 
allowed to be higher than sixty per cent of GDP (Rodenberg &s, 2003). Joining the EMU 
further implies giving up one’s own monetary policy for the one conducted by the ECB at the 
same time as adopting the euro as the main currency (Berg, 2003). The euro exchange rate is 
considered fixed among the members, but is allowed to float on foreign exchange markets. 
When needed the euro system might intervene by selling or buying euro against other 
currencies (Suomen pankki, n.d.). However, the switch from independent monetary policy to 
the joint one of the EMU does not imply that inflation and economic activity of the individual 
euro country cannot differ from the overall levels of the euro area. Deviations can occur both 
often and for long periods (Boije & Tägström, 2003). All risks associated with economic 
shocks are not removed or limited by the membership of a monetary union. 
 
The implementation of the Single European Act was followed by gradual removing of capital 
controls. According to Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993) this can partly be held responsible 
for problems in managing the Exchange Rate Mechanism and the currencies involved. This, 
in turn, created speculative pressures targeted at governments and central banks. And, as has 
been explained in the theoretical framework, speculative attacks play a role in the set-off of 
twin crises. This is also consistent with the results from Jonung’s study from 2010. 
 
It has been suggested by some researchers that the fact that countries within the EMS did not 
manage to cooperate to the extent necessary caused market pressures to deepen and turn into 
a crisis. If cooperation had worked better, the adjustment and response to market pressures 
would most likely have been smoother. Eichengreen concludes that if even Europe, one of 
the most developed regions when it came to monetary cooperation, had trouble dealing with 
the crisis in a joint manner, it shows that collective organization of exchange rates does not 
run without difficulties (Eichengreen, 2003). 
 
Unlike Finland, Sweden and Denmark decided to stay outside the EMU at its introduction in 
1999. Denmark acquired opt-out clauses in connection to the Maastricht Treaty (Flam et al., 
2009). Even though both Sweden and Denmark have shown interest in the monetary union 
and held referendums, the no-opinion has been the dominating result. Denmark has been 
	   28	  
granted exception from parts of the Maastricht Treaty, and is hence not obliged to enter into 
the monetary union. Sweden, however, does not have the same exception and is required to 
enter into the EMU according to the Maastricht Treaty. However, in practise this will not 
happen until (if) the Swedish government decides to. This is due to the fact that Sweden at 
the moment does not fulfil all requirements since it has not fixed its currency with the ERM 
II as well as has not adapted central bank legislation to fit the policy framework of the ECB. 
In the referendum in 2003, 56 per cent of the population voted against EMU membership 
(Flam et al., 2009). 
 
 
6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Chapter six presents the results that were obtained from the research and data. 
 
6.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The data set presented in chapter four has been plotted in graphs that are presented below.  
 
6.1.1 EXCHANGE RATE MOVEMENTS 
In Graph 1 the percentage change in exchange rates for Sweden, Denmark and Finland from 
1985 to 2013 can be observed. That the Swedish currency was valued below the Danish 
during most of the 1985-2013 period can be seen as a result of several devaluations that were 
made in Sweden in the 1980s as well as in relation to the crisis in early 1990s when the SEK 
was allowed to float. From the graph one can see that the Swedish and Finnish currencies  
	  
Data source: The World Bank. Denmark: DKK/USD, Sweden: SEK/USD, Finland: FIN/USD and EUR/USD. Currency per USD, yearly 
average, percentage change. 
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depreciated in 1993 and the USD became more expensive in relation to SEK and FIN. As 
reviewed in the previous chapter, the Swedish currency fell after it was allowed to float, 
suggesting that it was overvalued in the early 1990s.  
 
The Finnish currency has been the strongest among the three during the period studied. The 
gap around 1999 is due to the switch from the Finnish mark to the euro. After Finland’s 
switch to the euro in 1999, the movements in the Finnish and Danish currencies are almost 
identical. This is much expected considering that the DKK is fixed to the euro and their 
currencies should move in a jointly manner. 
 
6.1.2 GDP PER CAPITA 
Denmark has had the highest GDP per capita up until the end of the recent crisis when the 
country was surpassed by Sweden, as can be observed in Graph 2. It appears as if Finland 
experienced the largest drops both in the 1990s crisis as well as in the 2008-2009 crisis. Even 
though the three countries are on different levels, the nature of the development over time is 
similar among them. Positive and negative changes occur somewhat simultaneously among 
them.  
 
While Sweden and Finland both experienced negative changes in the GDP per capita growth 
rates in the early 1990s, Denmark managed to keep it at an increasing level. This suggests 
that Denmark was not hit as badly by the crisis as the other two countries, consistent with 
empirical evidence presented in the previous chapter as well as in the literature review.  
Data source: The World Bank. GDP/capita, international dollars, constant prices  
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Table 1: Correlation of GDP per capita 
  1991-2000 2001-2010 
Denmark, Finland 0,58 0,91 
Denmark, Sweden 0,72 0,93 
Sweden, Finland 0,89 0,93 
Own calculation. Data source: The World Bank. 
Table 2: Standard deviation of GDP per capita 
  1991-2000 2001-2010 
Denmark 0,01 0,02 
Finland 0,04 0,04 
Sweden 0,03 0,03 
Own calculation. Data source: The World Bank. 
 
Overall, though, it can be said that apart from some minor deviations the three countries have  
experienced quite similar developments of GDP per capita despite their different exchange 
rate regimes. 
 
In Table 1 the correlation coefficients between Denmark and Finland, Denmark and Sweden, 
and Sweden and Finland, are presented. Overall in the 1990s and 2000s the correlation was 
the strongest between Finland and Sweden. Both Sweden and Finland have increased their 
correlation with Denmark from the years 1991-2000 to 2001-2010. In the latter period they 
are all closely correlated. This suggests that there are other factors playing larger roles in the 
determination of the development of GDP per capita than the exchange rate since the 
countries are closely correlated despite their different exchange rate regimes.  
 
All standard deviations are low, suggesting that the countries GDP growth rates are not very 
volatile. It should be noted, however, that the calculations are based on yearly averages. With 
a higher frequency of the data, the variations could very well be higher. 
 
6.1.3 INFLATION 
From Graph 3 it is evident that Sweden experienced a very high inflation around the 1990s, 
which was also explained in the previous chapter. It is about four percentage points higher 
than Finland’s inflation peak of somewhere between six and seven per cent. It also, based on 
this data set, seems like Sweden’s recovery was more shaky (volatile) than Finland’s. This is 
also reflected in Table 4 showing the standard deviation calculations.  
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When it comes down to inflation patterns, the correlation was the strongest between Sweden 
and Finland in the 1990s, but stronger between Denmark and Finland in the 2000s. Most 
surprising is the massive increase in correlation between Denmark and Sweden from the first 
to the second period. The fact that Finland and Denmark now are so correlated is likely 
connected to the two countries being much under the influence of the ECB’s monetary 
policy. Sweden, being able to more freely conduct its monetary policy since leaving the 
pegged currency in 1993, can use more tools to try to affect the inflation. The inflation peak 
Sweden experienced in relation to the financial crisis might to some extent explain why the 
correlation between Sweden and Denmark was so low in 1991-2000.  
 
Both during the whole time period (1991-2010) and in the two sub-periods (1991-2000, 
2001-2010) the standard deviation was higher in Sweden than in Denmark and Finland. This 
suggests a more volatile evolution of the inflation rate in Sweden than in the other two 
countries during these decades. 
Data source: The IMF, inflation rate, average consumer prices. 
Table 3: Correlation of inflation 
  1991-2000 2001-2010 
Denmark, Finland 0,58 0,87 
Denmark, Sweden 0,17 0,83 
Finland, Sweden 0,73 0,74 
Own calculation. Data source: The IMF. 
 
 
 
 
Own calculation. Data source: The IMF. 
 
Table 4: Standard deviation of inflation 
  1991-2000 2001-2010 
Denmark 0,53 0,63 
Finland 1,08 1,03 
Sweden 2,88 1,16 
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6.1.4 UNEMPLOYMENT 
Denmark’s unemployment rate was higher than the other two’s in the 1980s, but as can be 
seen from the graph it managed to get down to the same level as Finland around 1986/87. 
What is remarkable from this graph is that Finland’s unemployment level skyrocketed in 
relation to the financial crisis in the early 1990s. As was mentioned previously, Finland was 
at this time also negatively affected by the problems in the Soviet Union. Perhaps this can 
account for some of the differences between the unemployment rates of Finland and the other 
two countries. The export sector was negatively affected and most likely also had 
consequences for the labour market. Though this is just speculation and the data does not 
explain the reason behind the differences, just the size of the disparities.  
 
What can further be seen from the graph above is that it takes almost ten years before the 
Finnish rate is down to the Swedish level. The Danish unemployment, peaking in 1993, had 
been the lowest up until 2011. While Denmark did fare better than Sweden and Finland in the 
early 1990s crisis, this graph shows that the country was still suffered some. The 
unemployment rate was almost ten per cent in 1993. Another fact that can be concluded from 
the data is that after the crisis escalating in 2008 the unemployment rates among the three 
countries have been converging to a level around eight per cent. According to the graph, 
Denmark’s rate seems to start diverging in 2012-2013 and decrease. Whether or not this 
pattern will continue will be evident in coming years. 
Data source: The IMF. Unemployment rate. 
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6.1.5 CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE 
In the graph it can be seen that Denmark had a current account deficit in the latter half of the 
1980s, which the country managed to turn into a surplus around 1990. While Sweden and 
Finland both experienced deficits around the turn of the decade up until sometime around 
1994, Denmark did not show the same figures. This possibly could be explained by the fact 
that Denmark had struggled already some years earlier and had to tighten the fiscal policy 
before the financial crisis broke out. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, Denmark was not as 
badly hit by the crisis as Finland and Sweden. If Sweden and Finland’s currencies were 
overvalued in the early 1990s, this would most likely have affected the current account 
balance negatively. From the previous chapter it was seen that in the new Finnish policy 
starting from 1995 one aspect was to limit government spending, which might be an 
explanation for what can be observed in the increasing current account surplus in the graph. 
Furthermore, it can be observed that Finland was the only country among the three that 
experienced a large drop in the 2000s, staring 2000-2001. It can possibly be connected to 
joining the EMU and hence giving up the ability to conduct independent monetary policy.  
Data source: The IMF. Current account balance. 
Data source: The World Bank. Exports of goods and services. 
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6.1.6 EXPORTS 
As can be observed in Graph 6, all three Nordic countries in this study are quite reliant on the 
export sector. The increased exports argued to have helped Finland and Sweden recover from 
the crisis in the early 1990s are visible as increases starting in 1992 and remaining a high 
percentage of GDP. There is a decrease around 2000, which is right after Finland switched to 
the Euro. This could, but definitely do not have to, imply that the exchange rate switch and/or 
the valuation of the mark at that time was not beneficial for the export sector. It could also 
represent a fear associated with the new currency and monetary regime, temporarily affecting 
the exports negatively. Sweden and Denmark also saw a drop in the exports’ share of GDP.  
 
6.1.7 PUBLIC DEBT 
Graph 7 suggests that all three countries had major public debts in the latter part of the 1990s 
(1985 to 1995 is not included in the graph due to scarcity of data). Denmark had a lower debt 
relative to the others during most of the time leading up to the 2008-2009 crisis. Denmark’s 
lowest point, with a central government debt of approximately 24 per cent of GDP, happened 
right before the crisis. After that the public debt started rising again. Finland, having its 
lowest peak about a year after Denmark, also experienced rising public debt as a result of the 
financial crisis. Sweden, on the other hand, has managed to keep its central government debt 
at a low level, and from 2010 has the lowest public debt as a percentage of GDP among the 
three countries. This further gives support to the argument that Sweden managed to survive 
the crisis better than Denmark and Finland. Even though the data does not tell us exactly 
what the increased debt in the other two countries was used for and whether or not Sweden 
would have benefited from using similar methods.  
Data source: The World Bank. Total central government debt. 
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From the country-specific overview of Denmark, it was concluded that many Danish banks 
struggled in the financial crisis, several ending in bankruptcy. Extensive bailout deals were 
made and backed by the central government, possibly accounting for some of the increased 
debt (Andersson, 2008). However, just because the Swedish government is doing well on the 
debt side does not necessarily mean that the entire economy is showing a pattern in the 
similar direction. On the contrary, there is some evidence for increased debt among private 
households in recent years (Alfelt & Winstrand, 2015). 
 
6.2 ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 
 
6.2.1 REGRESSION RESULTS 
The results from the simple regression model with first difference of logged unemployment 
as the dependent variable showed no significance of the logged difference in the exchange 
rate coefficient with four lags. This would suggest that in this data set there is not much 
evidence for a linear relationship between exchange rate movements and changes in the 
unemployment rate. An attempt of a regression with no lags was done as well, but the 
exchange rate coefficient was not significant here either. The coefficients of GDP and CPI 
with four quarterly lags showed to be significant, GDP with a significance level of 0.1 and 
CPI with 0.05. The coefficients of GDP!!! and ER!!! were slightly negative but close to zero, 
the CPI!!!-coefficient was positive and approximately 2.8 suggesting a positive relationship 
with the unemployment rate. The results from this regression did not give much information 
about what possible connection there could be between the exchange rate and unemployment. 
The table containing the full results from the OLS regression is available in Appendix 2. 
 
6.2.2 VAR MODEL RESULTS 
The results from the VAR model are presented in table A3 in Appendix 3. As is visible in the 
table, all four lagged GDP coefficients are significant for unemployment while, according to 
the results from this specific model on this specific data set, the exchange rate does not have 
any significant impact on unemployment. However, there seems to be reason to believe that 
there could be Granger causality in the opposite direction. The coefficients for unemployment 
with one, two and three quarterly are significant with a 0.05 significance level. Furthermore, 
the exchange rate change in period t-1 seem to possibly have an affect on the exchange rate in 
period t, suggesting that the change in exchange rate in the current quarter depends on the 
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exchange rate change in the previous quarter. The coefficient of the exchange rate change in 
period t-1 is further significant for the change in consumer price index in period t. The 
coefficients of the exchange rate change in period t-2 are also significant for unemployment 
and CPI. In the table, for the equation with unemployment as the dependant variable, GDP 
has negative coefficients, exchange rate circulates around zero and mostly negative, and CPI 
has positive coefficients except from the coefficient with one quarterly lag. This is somewhat 
similar to what the OLS regression showed. 
 
The results from the VAR model cannot be interpreted without uncertainty. Enders (2010) 
concluded that unrestricted VAR model results are commonly overparameterised. Moreover, 
due to the model’s lack of theoretical background it is hard to draw any conclusions (Asteriou 
& Hall, 2011), but it can be a good choice in order to explore what type of relationship could 
possibly exist between a certain set of variables. 
 
6.3 RESULTS IN COMPARISON TO PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
The results from the econometric models used in the research for this paper suggest that it is 
hard to determine any direct effects of changes in the exchange rate on changes in the 
unemployment rate for Sweden under its flexible exchange rate, even after adding lagged 
variables. That changes in the value of the exchange rate will automatically generate lower 
unemployment, or higher GDP, seems hence unlikely if using the interpretation of the results 
from the simple models conducted here. These results were expected since it from previous 
literature has been determined that it is hard to determine the causation between the exchange 
rate and other variables. Even if there is evidence supporting some sort of correlation 
between variables it does not necessarily imply causation.  
 
Taking into account that the econometrical models used here are quite simplistic and the data 
set is relatively small, it is not possible to draw any general conclusions, but just a way to 
deeper explore what the data set can tell us about its properties. The VAR model is a bit more 
comprehensive than the simple regression and explores the data deeper. But these results do 
not really confirm the results of previous research such as the study by Feldman (2011). 
Perhaps data on more countries, data with higher frequency or more variables added to the 
regressions would have improved the results and made them more similar to the results 
received from the previous studies conducted by scholars. 
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7. DISCUSSION 
Chapter seven discusses the findings presented in chapter six and relates them to the 
theoretical framework and the papers in the literature review. 
 
7.1 EXCHANGE RATES IN THE 1990s – DENMARK VS SWEDEN 
AND FINLAND 
The macroeconomic trilemma states that a country cannot have a fixed exchange rate, open 
capital markets and independent monetary policy simultaneously. Considering that the 
removal of controls in the 1980s made markets more integrated than ever before, the choice 
more or less boiled down to choosing between a fixed exchange rate and the ability to 
conduct independent monetary policy. Denmark has managed to keep a credible fixed 
exchange rate regime up until the recent financial crisis, something that is very much an 
exception in comparison with the other Nordic countries. Scholars seem to be quite united in 
the view that increased capital flows as a result of increasingly globalizing markets was a 
large offset in the 1990s crisis. This is consistent with the theoretical framework and 
Eichengreen’s theory of the connection between capital flows and crises.  
 
The turbulence during the 1990s that forced both Sweden and Finland to abandon their fixed 
exchange rates did not end up forcing Denmark to do the same. As was mentioned earlier, 
one explanation could be the fact that Denmark experienced trouble in its economy already in 
the 1980s. Denmark made arrangements, such as the kartoffelkur which changed the 
conditions for mortgages and credit granting and tax reforms. That the country started these 
reforms earlier – before the currency crisis escalated in Europe and the financial crisis spread 
in the Nordics – could possibly explain why Denmark managed to not get as badly affected 
by the twin crisis as its neighbours. These fiscal policies can be argued to have prevented the 
lending boom and speculative attacks that were visible in Finland and Sweden to become 
equally large in Denmark. That all countries had fixed exchange rates at the time of the crisis 
meant that they could not use monetary policy instruments to a wide extent. With a fixed 
exchange rate the risk that currencies are overvalued also exists since they are not allowed to 
automatically adjust to the market value. These limitations put heavier pressure on fiscal 
policy instruments in the 1990s, as can be seen by the tax reforms etcetera that was 
implemented. History suggests that Sweden started to change policies and react to what was 
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happening too late and hence was not able to stop the crisis without giving up the fixed 
exchange rate.  
 
After Sweden and Finland allowed their currencies to float, both currencies were immediately 
devalued. As can be seen in the descriptive statistic in chapter six, the exports of both Finland 
and Sweden started to rise in the first half of the 1990s, consistent with economic theory. It 
was furthermore argued previously that increased exports helped both Sweden and Finland to 
recover from the crisis (Pikkarainen et al., 1997; Berg & Gröttheim, 1997). Sweden 
continued to float even after the recovery from the turbulent years in the early 1990s. An 
explanation for the country’s successful management with the flexible rate could be how fast 
and effective the monetary policy goal was switched from an exchange rate target to inflation 
target, and succeeding with using the markets and the interest rate to affect economic 
behavior (Eichengreen, 2003).  
 
In Sweden’s case the floating exchange rate does seem to benefit the country more than a 
fixed. It should not be forgotten, however, that both Sweden and Finland’s economies were 
doing exceptionally well in the late 1980s with their fixed rates. It could be that, in order for 
fixed exchange rates to work well within Sweden, the capital flows should not be too large so 
monetary policy can still be used freely. Another possibility is that it was more the shock of 
the macroeconomic trilemma boiling down to a dilemma between a fixed exchange rate and 
independent monetary policy that happened too fast for Sweden and Finland to deal with the 
changes. With a flexible rate the automatic stabilisers might have started the recovery process 
earlier. Jonung (2010) argues that with flexible rates Finland and Sweden would have been 
able to deal with the crisis in a more efficient way. 
 
7.2 2008-2009 CRISIS – SWEDEN VS DENMARK AND FINLAND 
While the main emphasis so far in this chapter has been on the early 1990s, comparing the 
effects of different exchange rate regimes during the crisis of that decade with what happened 
in the recent global crisis is a natural step in making the analysis broader and more current. 
An important difference between the crisis of the 1990s and the crisis of 2008 is the 
commitment to keep and stabilize the fixed exchange rates, which was a major part of all 
three countries’ monetary regimes in the early 1990s (Eichengreen, 2003). Mundell has 
argued that the euro does not bear the blame for the recent crisis, but that it all boils down to 
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fiscal solvency problems among some countries in the Euro area (Sutherland et al., 2012). 
However, everyone does not share his point of view. Debates over whether or not standing 
outside of the euro zone saved some countries, like Sweden, from falling into a great 
recession in the late 2000s has been brought up a lot in recent years.  
 
An argument against membership in the EMU is that Sweden and Denmark have managed 
very well without joining, better than Finland it would seem. GDP per capita is higher in 
these countries compared to the EU average and it has been suggested that not adopting the 
euro as the main currency helped Sweden to handle and recover relatively smoothly from the 
2008 crisis. Sweden and Denmark, in terms of monetary and fiscal policy, have also managed 
to keep inflation at a low and steady level (Flam et al., 2009). The goal of monetary policy 
further differs between Sweden and Denmark. As mentioned in previous chapters, Sweden 
has adopted an inflation target while Denmark focuses on keeping its exchange rate fixed 
towards the euro without too much volatility.  
 
It is hard to predict what would have happened under other currencies, such as Finland not 
being part of the EMU or if Sweden had decided to join the monetary union alternatively 
return to a pegged currency. The Growth and Strategy (GnS) economics report from 2012 
suggests that this is because currency rates tend to follow a random walk, making the future 
unpredictable. However, the data on GDP suggest that even with different exchange rate 
regimes the growth rates have been quite similar among the three countries in the 2000s, with 
correlations close to one. These cross-country comparisons hence seem to support an opinion 
of exchange rate regime choices becoming less important as markets become more 
integrated. During the financial crisis, though, there were some differences in how much the 
countries were hit by negative effects. In the years leading up to the introduction of the EMU, 
studies found that Sweden would have a hard time adjusting to asymmetric shocks in the 
absence of independent monetary policy and an exchange rate allowed to float (Suni & 
Vihriälä, 2013). So, even if the growth trends appear similar between Sweden and Finland in 
the present case, the same might not have been true if Sweden had been the one joining the 
monetary union and Finland had stuck with a flexible exchange rate. 
 
Flam et al. (2009) found that Denmark’s policy of fixing its exchange rate to the euro and the 
historical evidence of a monetary policy rate closely following the one of the ECB, 
insinuating that the overall macroeconomic development of this small, open economy would 
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most likely have been very similar if Denmark had decided to join the EMU at its beginning 
in 1999. They further found that the monetary union most likely have not affected the 
dynamics of public debt and deficits of the countries within the euro area. The descriptive 
data of public debt as a percentage of GDP presented in chapter six show very similar 
developments among Sweden, Finland and Denmark, much supporting the conclusion by 
Flam et al.  
 
The results from the econometric models do not show much significant support for the 
impact of exchange rate volatility on unemployment and GDP. One possibility could be that 
the exchange rate might affect these variables indirectly, through CPI and other possible 
factors, as well as in its way of limiting the possibility to conduct certain types of monetary 
and fiscal policies. Previous studies are divided in their results. Some studies say the 
exchange rate regime does not matter, some say currency union is the optimal choice, and 
some promote flexible rates. The theories most likely differ between developed and 
developing countries as well. Sweden, Finland and Denmark are very much developed, and 
they are all doing relatively well even with different regimes.  
 
All in all, the results from the econometric model conducted here does not give any 
significant confirmation of any of the results that Feldman (2011), Jonung (2010), Kiander 
and Vartia (2011), and Ghosh et al. (1996) reached in their studies on the effect of different 
exchange rates on economic growth and crisis recovery. Mostly, it follows the conclusions by 
Suni and Vihriälä (2013) in saying that it does not seem to exist that big of a difference 
between fixed and flexible rates in the Nordic countries. The results of Ghosh et al.’s model 
suggested that countries with pegged exchange rates generally experience lower inflation. 
But if observing Graph 3 showing the rate of inflation for Sweden, Denmark and Finland, the 
data from 1985 to 2013 does not support these findings. Sweden’s inflation showed to be 
lower during the period with a flexible rate, and during the latter years the patterns are very 
similar among the three countries despite their different exchange rate regimes. Finland’s 
current account deficit suggests that joining the EMU has changed either the balance of 
payments or the capital account. This suggests that even if the exchange rate regime 
according to the tests conducted in this research does not support any big effect of changes in 
exchange rates, changing the regime may be able to have effects on the economy through 
other channels, such as the current account balance. 
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Considering the regularity at which countries change their exchange rate regimes, what is 
considered to be the best rate for a certain country can differ in different time periods. 
Denmark has managed to stick to its regime for a long time, all through the scope of this 
research (1985-2013), while Sweden switched once and Finland twice. The euro crisis most 
likely has brought negative effects, and whether a currency fixed to the euro will continue to 
be an optimal choice for Denmark only the future will be able to tell. 
 
 
8. CONCLUSION 
 
The crisis of the early 1990s in the Nordic countries was to a large extent caused by the 
increased globalisation connected to the removal of capital controls of the 1980s. The 
monetary and fiscal tools used and policies implemented resulted in various outcomes. In this 
paper it has been explored to what extent the choice of exchange rate regime, and hence the 
possibility to conduct independent monetary policy, affected the recovery after the 1990s and 
2000s crises as well as the economic development in the period ranging from 1985 up until 
2013. 
 
For most of the economic indicators studied, quite similar patterns could be seen among 
Sweden, Denmark and Finland. This is especially true for the 2000s. The correlation 
coefficients showed that the inflation and GDP per capita trends have become more 
correlated between Sweden, Denmark and Finland in the 2000s compared to the 1990s. This 
suggest that independent of whether one has exchange rate stability or inflation targeting as 
the main policy goal, the economic outcomes are much similar in today’s globalised world. 
At least for the small, open Nordic countries. 
 
In the 1990s when all countries were under pegged exchange rates and hit by a crisis, 
Denmark managed to handle the situation better than the other two. When allowed to adopt a 
flexible rate, Sweden became the frontrunner with its development in the 2008 crisis and 
quick recovery after the exchange rate was changed following the 1990s crisis. Finland did 
also manage a quite impressive recovery from the first crisis, at least in terms of GDP and 
inflation. This has been argued to be an outcome of the increase in exports following the 
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currency devaluation as a result from changing to a flexible exchange rate. Unemployment, 
however, lingered high for a long time. Since Finland did not have a flexible rate during any 
of the crises it is impossible to know exactly how the growth and crisis management would 
have looked like under such conditions. Simulation results from previous studies have 
generated support both for and against a crucial role of the choice of exchange rate regime. 
This topic is within a field of research where it is hard to distinguish cause from effect, 
making it impossible to with any certainty say that one regime is better than another in every 
given scenario. 
 
This research has not managed to draw any broad conclusions about the exact role of the 
exchange rate and which regime is the best for economic growth and crisis recovery. It has, 
however, managed to give some clarity on what the theory, literature and research say on the 
matter and it has offered a qualified discussion of pros and cons for either regime based on 
available data from 1985 to 2013 for Sweden, Finland and Denmark. The role of the 
exchange rate is a topic that have been widely researched and debated, and so far there seems 
to be no clear answer to what is the best type of regime in all situations to best handle the 
macroeconomic trilemma and increased capital flows. The uncertainty around the power of 
the exchange rate will most likely be a hot topic for further research in many years to come. 
Like Eichengreen once expressed it, ”The exchange rate is the chink in the armor of modern-
day macroeconomic policymakers” (Eichengreen, 2003:99). 
 
A possibility to extend this research would be to do a more comprehensive VAR analysis 
including more relevant variables and also to test for Granger causality. To include Denmark 
and Finland in the econometric model would make possible for deeper cross-country 
conclusions. 
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APPENDIX 1: VAR MODEL SPECIFICATION 
 𝑈𝑁! =   −  𝛾! + 𝛼!!𝑈𝑁!!! + 𝛼!!𝑈𝑁!!! + 𝛼!!𝑈𝑁!!! + 𝛼!!𝑈𝑁!!! + 𝛽!!𝐺𝐷𝑃!!! +𝛽!!𝐺𝐷𝑃!!! + 𝛽!!𝐺𝐷𝑃!!! + 𝛽!!𝐺𝐷𝑃!!! + 𝜃!!𝐸𝑅!!! + 𝜃!!𝐸𝑅!!! + 𝜃!!𝐸𝑅!!! +𝜃!!𝐸𝑅!!! + 𝜙!!𝐶𝑃𝐼!!! + 𝜙!!𝐶𝑃𝐼!!! + 𝜙!!𝐶𝑃𝐼!!! + 𝜙!!𝐶𝑃𝐼!!! + 𝑒!!"   (A1a) 
 𝐺𝐷𝑃! = −𝛾! + 𝛼!!𝑈𝑁!!! + 𝛼!!𝑈𝑁!!! + 𝛼!!𝑈𝑁!!! + 𝛼!!𝑈𝑁!!! + 𝛽!!𝐺𝐷𝑃!!! +𝛽!!𝐺𝐷𝑃!!! + 𝛽!!𝐺𝐷𝑃!!! + 𝛽!!𝐺𝐷𝑃!!! + 𝜃!!𝐸𝑅!!! + 𝜃!!𝐸𝑅!!! + 𝜃!!𝐸𝑅!!! + 𝜃!!𝐸𝑅!!! +𝜙!!𝐶𝑃𝐼!!! + 𝜙!!𝐶𝑃𝐼!!! + 𝜙!!𝐶𝑃𝐼!!! + 𝜙!!𝐶𝑃𝐼!!! + 𝑒!!"#    (A1b) 
 𝐸𝑅! =     𝛾! + 𝛼!!𝑈𝑁!!! + 𝛼!!𝑈𝑁!!! + 𝛼!!𝑈𝑁!!! + 𝛼!!𝑈𝑁!!! + 𝛽!!𝐺𝐷𝑃!!! + 𝛽!!𝐺𝐷𝑃!!! +𝛽!!𝐺𝐷𝑃!!! + 𝛽!!𝐺𝐷𝑃!!! + 𝜃!!𝐸𝑅!!! + 𝜃!!𝐸𝑅!!! + 𝜃!!𝐸𝑅!!! + 𝜃!!𝐸𝑅!!! + 𝜙!!𝐶𝑃𝐼!!! +𝜙!!𝐶𝑃𝐼!!! + 𝜙!!𝐶𝑃𝐼!!! + 𝜙!!𝐶𝑃𝐼!!! + 𝑒!!"      (A1c) 
   𝐶𝑃𝐼! = −𝛾! + 𝛼!!𝑈𝑁!!! + 𝛼!!𝑈𝑁!!! + 𝛼!!𝑈𝑁!!! + 𝛼!!𝑈𝑁!!! + 𝛽!!𝐺𝐷𝑃!!! +𝛽!!𝐺𝐷𝑃!!! + 𝛽!!𝐺𝐷𝑃!!! + 𝛽!!𝐺𝐷𝑃!!! + 𝜃!!𝐸𝑅!!! + 𝜃!!𝐸𝑅!!! + 𝜃!!𝐸𝑅!!! +𝜃!!𝐸𝑅!!! + 𝜙!!𝐶𝑃𝐼!!! + 𝜙!!𝐶𝑃𝐼!!! + 𝜙!!𝐶𝑃𝐼!!! + 𝜙!!𝐶𝑃𝐼!!! + 𝑒!!"#   (A1d) 
 
UN = logged first difference of unemployment 
ER = logged first difference of exchange rate 
GDP = logged first difference of GDP 
CPI = logged first difference of CPI 𝛾! , 𝛾! , 𝛾! , 𝛾! = intercepts for equation A1a-A1d 𝛼!" = coefficient for UN in equation x with y number of lags 𝛽!" = coefficient for GDP in equation x with y number of lags 𝜃!" = coefficient for ER in equation x with y number of lags 𝜙!" = coefficient for CPI in equation x with y number of lags 𝑒!!" , 𝑒!!"# , 𝑒!!" , 𝑒!!"# = error terms for equation A1a-A1d 
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APPENDIX 2: OLS REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
Table A2: Results OLS regression 
  (1) 
VARIABLES UN 
    GDP!!! -0.130* 
  (0.08) ER!!! -0.013 
  (0.12) CPI!!! 2.839** 
  (1.15) 
Constant -0.010 
 
(0.01) 
 
  
Observations 59 
R-squared 0.110 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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APPENDIX 3: VAR MODEL RESULTS 
 
Table A3: Results VAR model 
	  	  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES UN GDP ER CPI 
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  UN!!!	   0.022 -0.080* 0.364** 0.017 
	  	   (0.14) (0.04) (0.17) (0.02) UN!!!	   0.123 0.058 -0.365** 0.012 
	  	   (0.14) (0.04) (0.18) (0.02) UN!!!	   0.115 0.087** -0.354** -0.019 
	  	   (0.13) (0.04) (0.16) (0.02) UN!!!	   -0.115 0.015 0.205 -0.014 
	  	   (0.12) (0.04) (0.15) (0.01) GDP!!!	   -0.796*** -0.098 -0.078 0.006 
	  	   (0.30) (0.09) (0.38) (0.04) GDP!!!	   -0.859*** 0.003 -0.444 0.066* 
	  	   (0.29) (0.09) (0.37) (0.04) GDP!!!	   -0.866*** -0.080 -0.342 -0.007 
	  	   (0.30) (0.09) (0.37) (0.04) GDP!!!	   -0.891*** 0.883*** -0.238 0.024 
	  	   (0.29) (0.09) (0.37) (0.04) ER!!!	   0.067 -0.052 0.579*** -0.039*** 
	  	   (0.11) (0.03) (0.14) (0.01) ER!!!	   -0.133 0.021 -0.241* 0.026* 
	  	   (0.11) (0.03) (0.14) (0.01) ER!!!	   -0.093 -0.043 -0.061 -0.001 
	  	   (0.11) (0.03) (0.14) (0.01) ER!!!	   -0.091 0.048 -0.013 0.006 
	  	   (0.11) (0.03) (0.14) (0.01) CPI!!!	   -1.178 -0.636* 1.718 0.283** 
	  	   (1.09) (0.33) (1.38) (0.14) CPI!!!	   0.865 -0.461 2.413* -0.039 
	  	   (1.15) (0.35) (1.45) (0.15) CPI!!!	   1.860 0.177 -4.288*** 0.268* 
	  	   (1.18) (0.36) (1.49) (0.15) CPI!!!	   1.580 -1.318*** -0.150 -0.308** 
	  	   (1.19) (0.36) (1.50) (0.15) 
Constant 0.010 0.009*** 0.008 0.002 
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
  
   
  
Observations 59 59 59 59 
Standard errors in parentheses 
  
  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
 
